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Governments set numerous norms to protect consumers. Two countries may achieve the same level of 
protection of their consumers through different speciﬁcations. The adaptation costs induced by these 
differences create barriers to trade. The principle of mutual recognition addresses the problem by ensuring 
that products lawfully manufactured in one country are acceptable without adaptation in another country. 
We show that by shifting the transaction costs of adapting to several norms from ﬁrms to consumers the 
principle  of  mutual  recognition  creates  disparities  across  countries  and  is  (more)  beneﬁcial  to  larger 
countries. 
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author. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
National norms applicable to certain products pursue general objectives such
as trade fairness, consumers protection or product compatibility. For in-
stance, norms can protect consumers against sellers who have a better in-
formation about the product that they sell. Diﬀerent States can pursue the
same general objectives and reach the same level of consumers protection,
but in the absence of coordination, their legislation diﬀers, yielding diﬀerent
norms. Therefore, a company wishing to export must adapt its product to
the norms of the export market. Adaptation is expensive even if the non-
adapted product gives the same level of protection to the consumers as an
adapted product.
Norms are of concern to WTO as far as they can be strategically used by
local governments as technical barriers to trade. We present the literature
on the strategic use of norms at the end of this introduction. In this paper
we adopt a diﬀerent view. Norms act as barriers to trade even if they are not
set strategically as such. Although numerous norms are set to protect con-
sumers but not to restrict trade, they have a negative side-eﬀect on trade.
This problem has long been recognized by the EU, which, for many years,
tried to address the costs of regulationh e t e r o g e n e i t yb yr e g u l a t i o nh a r m o -
nization. However, harmonizing regulations of a large set of countries can be
extremely slow if it requires a unanimous approval by Member States (see
Paul Brenton, John Sheehy and Marc Vancauteren, 2001). About 25 years
ago, the European Commission addressed the problem by adopting the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition.1 In February 2009, the Committee on economic
and monetary aﬀairs of the European Parliament advocated gradually inte-
grating the EU and US markets through mutual recognition combined with a
degree of convergence of the current regulatory frameworks (European Par-
liament, 2009). The principle of mutual recognition ensures that ap r o d u c t
lawfully manufactured in one Member State is acceptable without adaptation
in another Member State, provided that both legislations reach the same level
of consumers protection. Should this condition be interpreted with suﬃcient
ﬂexibility, the good application of the principle would reduce production and
export costs, and consumers would have access to a wider range of products.
Do consumers always gain from the application of the principle of mutual
recognition? The question is all the more acute that the principle could also
be applied to services. As pointed out by Jacques Pelkmans (2005), it is
1There is also a rapid spread of mutual recognition agreements between the EU and
its major trading partners, within APEC and other regional arrangements, see Richard
E. Baldwin (2000).
1more diﬃcult to assess the quality of a service than that of a good, which
explains the numerous norms set to ensure a proper functioning of service
markets. Under the principle of mutual recognition, a company that exports
a product (a service or a good) has two options. Either it adapts its product
to the norms of the host country, or it does not. If both countries followed
the same general objectives when setting their norms, the two options oﬀer
the same broad protection to consumers. Still, it is likely that consumers
prefer products delivered under a familiar set of rules to products operated
under unfamiliar norms, that is, a non-adapted product provides a lower
utility than an adapted product.
To illustrate the last point, consider the service provided by architects
in countries A and B. To protect the buyers of this service, norms are set
on several dimensions of the service: they deﬁne the responsibility of the
parties in case of construction delays, the type of the after-sale service,
... Country A may grant a large after-sale service and a poor protection
to consumers against delays. Country B may oﬀer the opposite. Globally
consumers beneﬁt from the same global protection in both countries and may
end up being indiﬀerent between both sets of norms if they perfectly knew
both sets of norms. However, consumers from A probably know the norms
from A, or at least they know where they could get the information about
these norms. By contrast, they are probably more ignorant of B-norms,
even more so if these norms are written in a foreign language. In case of
construction delays, a consumer from A ,w h oh a sb o u g h tac o n t r a c to p e r a t e d
under B-norms by application of the principle of mutual recognition, may
not even think that he beneﬁts from a good protection, which prevents
him to take the full beneﬁt of his contract. For this reason a consumer
who does not know foreign norms discounts the utility of consuming a good
produced exclusively under foreign norms. The alternative is that he learns
norms from B, which allows him to take the full beneﬁt of goods produced
under foreign norms. However, learning is costly. As a matter of fact,
the application of the principle of mutual recognition shifts the transaction
costs of adapting to several norms from the ﬁrms to the consumers (Kalypso
Nicolaïdis and Susanne K. Schmidt, 2007).
To assess the welfare eﬀects of the mutual recognition principle, we use a
model with monopolistic competition and two countries. On the one hand,
ﬁrms reduce their costs by using the principle of mutual recognition because
they are not forced to adapt their products to foreign markets. This reduc-
tion of costs promotes entry of new ﬁrms, which is beneﬁcial to consumers
who exhibit preference for variety. On the other hand, products are less
adapted, which is detrimental to consumers who discount the utility of con-
2suming a non-adapted product, which we deﬁne as the adaptation discount.
We also examine how ﬁrms respond to the principle of mutual recognition
by selecting their preferred rules among those oﬀered by the two countries.
We consider two settings. In the ﬁrst, we assume that consumers do not
learn foreign norms. We identify a home market eﬀect because consumers
are biased towards products operated under familiar norms: ﬁrms dispro-
portionately use the norms of the larger country because these norms are
familiar to the larger population.
If the adaptation discount is small, all ﬁrms choose the norms of the
larger country. For instance, cars registered in France were required to have
yellow headlights since 1936, in contrast with the rest of Europe. Since
the early-nineties cars equipped with white headlights, which is the norm
in the rest of Europe, can be sold in France. Consumers probably have a
negligible adaptation discount for headlights. Nearly all cars sold in France
are nowadays equipped with white headlights.
For an intermediate adaptation discount some ﬁrms use exclusively the
norms of the larger country whereas the other ﬁrms adapt their product to
both legislations. Firms do not use the principle of mutual recognition if
the adaptation discount is large; they prefer to adapt their product in order
to keep a suﬃciently large export market. A large adaptation discount is
consistent the EU insurance market (Schmidt, 2002): in 1997 the market
share of life and non-life insurance in Germany was smaller than one percent
for non German EU companies operating under their home norms.
Consumers from the larger country always gain from the application
of the principle of mutual recognition. They have access to more numer-
ous goods, most of them using the rules of their country, either exclusively
or in combination with the foreign rules. By contrast consumers from the
smaller country unambiguously lose if the adaptation discount takes inter-
mediate values: they beneﬁt from more products but fewer are adapted to
their norms, which is quite costly because of the non negligible adaptation
discount. For a small adaptation discount those consumers unambiguously
gain but their gain is smaller than the gains obtained in the larger country.2
The application of the principle of mutual recognition improves welfare in
both countries only for some parameter values and at the costs of increased
disparities.
In the second setting we assume that consumers can learn foreign norms
at some costs. By learning foreign norms they fully beneﬁt from a product
2For a large adaptation discount, ﬁrms do not use the principle of mutual recognition
and adapt their products.
3that has not been adapted to their national norms. We identify the follow-
ing equilibria according to the adaptation discount. For a small discount,
nobody learn the foreign speciﬁcation and the former analysis holds. For an
intermediate and a large discount, households from country A learn norms
of country B; all ﬁr m su s en o r m so fc o u n t r yBa st h e s ea r ek n o w nb ya l l
consumers, and households from country B do not need to learn rules from
A, which are not used. Firms use country B norms that are universally
known.3
Another equilibrium exists when the adaptation discount is large: all
ﬁrms adapt their product to both sets of rules and, as a result, consumers
do not learn the foreign speciﬁcations. Multiple equilibria ensue for large
adaptation discounts. We show that the households who do not learn foreign
speciﬁcations unambiguously gain when the principle of mutual recognition
is applied: more products are available and these products use their spec-
iﬁcations. Households who learn the foreign speciﬁcations gain only if the
cost of learning is small enough.
The model is quite general and applies to any good that is sold in one of
the two countries, even if the good is produced in a third country that has
not signed a principle of mutual recognition with the two other countries.
When it sells in the two countries, the third country producer chooses its
preferred norms among the norms of the two countries.
If one focusses the analysis to the producers of the two countries and
if one assumes that ﬁrms must use the norms applicable in the country of
production when they sell in that country, then the model identiﬁes a new
force of ﬁrms agglomeration that complements the forces analyzed in the
new economic geography literature.4 For large and intermediate adaptation
discounts, households from a ﬁrst country learn foreign rules and ﬁrms pro-
duce in the second country to use rules that are universally known. This
equilibrium exists even if countries have identical sizes; moreover in case
of countries of diﬀerent sizes, agglomeration can take place in the smaller
country. As emphasized by Baldwin (2000, p. 239), falling tariﬀ levels,
teamed with lower transportation and communication costs, “means that
3This result is familiar in the literature on multilingualism, see Reinhard Selten and
Jonathan Pool (1991), Jeﬀrey Church and Ian King (1993), Jean Gabszewicz et al. (2005).
Agents from country A learn the language of country B if the beneﬁt of communicating
with foreign agents is large. Because agents from A are able to communicate by using the
B-language, few agents from B learn the A-language.
4Paul Krugman (1991), Anthony Venables (1996), Masahisa Fujita, Krugman and
Venables (1999), Fujita and Jacques F. Thisse (2002), Richard Baldwin, Rikard Forslid,
Philippe Martin, Gianmarco Ottaviano and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud (2003).
4even a slight tilt tends to have large eﬀects on the location of production.
In particular, seemingly minor diﬀerences in technical norms can have an
outsized eﬀect on production.”
To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst theoretical model that
analyses the eﬀects of the mutual recognition principle on welfare and on
ﬁrms location when norms are not set strategically. In the related literature,
Arnaud Costinot (2008) considers standards set up to cope with environmen-
tal externalities (vertical standards) and product compatibility (horizontal
standards). In a two ﬁrms, two countries model he examines how stan-
dards are strategically set under the mutual recognition principle and under
the national treatment principle. He shows that standards are imposed for
levels of externalities that are too high under the mutual recognition prin-
ciple. Other papers emphasize how protectionist incentives interfere with
the setting of norms; see Ronald Fischer and Pablo Serra (2000), Kyle Bag-
well and Robert W. Staiger (2001), Neil Gandal and Oz Shy (2001), Akiko
Suwa-Eisenmann and Thierry Verdier (2002), Mikhail M. Klimenko (2009).
Empirical estimations by Silja Baller (2007) show that mutual recogni-
tion agreements have a strong positive inﬂuence on both export probabilities
and trade volumes for partner countries. Maggie X. Chen and Aaditya Mat-
too (2008) also show that such agreements are promoting trade. Roland de
Bruijn, Henk Kox and Arjan Lejour (2008) use an applied general equilib-
rium model of the world economy to assess the performance of an EU pro-
posal to fully extend the principle of mutual recognition to services. They
show that a full implementation of the proposal would increase GDP of the
EU by 0.3-0.6%, while consumption growth would be between 0.7 and 1.2%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section sets up the
model with agents preferences, their decision to learn foreign rules, and
ﬁrms behavior in terms of prices and output. Sections 3 and 4 examine
the equilibrium choice of rules, respectively under the assumptions that
households cannot learn foreign rules and that they are able to learn them.
This discussion is followed by the conclusion.
2 The model
The model builds on Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1977) with
two countries, r and s. The population in country k ∈ {r,s} is equal to
Lk. Without loss of generality, we suppose that Lr ≥ Ls.W ec o n s i d e r a n
increasing returns to scale sector that uses a single input to produce diﬀer-
entiated varieties. There is a ﬁxed cost and the marginal cost is normalized
5to one. Free entry determines the mass of varieties that are produced.
2.1 Preferences
Free entry determines the mass of ﬁrms N.E a c hﬁrm produces a diﬀeren-
tiated variety i ∈ [0,N] that is designed to the speciﬁcations of at least one
country, which we call the home country. In the absence of mutual recogni-
tion ﬁrms must adapt their product to the speciﬁcations of the other country
in order to export. This adaptation is costly but it allows all consumers to
take the full beneﬁt from these products. In case of mutual recognition,
ﬁrms are allowed to sell their product to the foreign country with or with-
out adaptation to the foreign speciﬁcations. However foreign consumers do
not fully beneﬁt from non-adapted products. Still, a consumer may costly
learn the foreign speciﬁcations, which allows her to take the full beneﬁtf r o m
consuming foreign non-adapted varieties.
A consumer of country k (k ∈ {r,s}) who has not learned foreign speci-



















where l ∈ {r,s} and l 6= k. The parameter σ>1 denotes the elasticity of
substitution between varieties. The variable nk denotes the mass of ﬁrms
that use exclusively the norms from k, na is the mass of ﬁrms that adapt
their variety to both countries. Ck(i) is the consumption of a variety i that
is designed for the only speciﬁcations of country k. Ca(i) is the consumption
of a variety that has been adapted to the speciﬁcations of both countries.
In case of mutual recognition, a household can consume a non adapted
variety. However the household does not fully beneﬁt from the variety if she
has not learned the foreign speciﬁcations; she discounts her utility of con-
suming that variety with a factor φ ∈ (0,1).T h ev a l u eo fφ is probably very
close to one for headlights and pencils, it is probably lower for a washing ma-
chine because of potential diﬀerences in the warranty and after sale service
and is is probably much lower for insurance and architect contracts. There
is no discount (φ =1 ) if the household has learned the foreign speciﬁcations
because she then know precisely what she buys. If the two countries did
not agree on mutual recognition, a household could not consume a foreign
variety that has not been adapted to domestic speciﬁcations : Cl(i)=0for
ac o n s u m e ro fk.5
5Equivalently it is as if φ was equal to zero.
6The earnings of each household are normalized to one. Accordingly,
a household in country k who has not learned foreign speciﬁcations de-
mands Ck(i)=( pk (i))
−σ Pσ−1
k units of a variety that is only designed for
domestic speciﬁcations; she demands Ca(i)=( pa (i))
−σ Pσ−1
k units of a
variety designed for the speciﬁcations of both countries and she demands
Cl(i)=Φ(pl (i))
−σ Pσ−1
k units of a variety designed only for the speciﬁca-
tions of the foreign country. In these expressions, pk (i) is the price set by a
ﬁrm that designs its variety only for country k,w h e r e a spa (i) is the price set
by a ﬁrm that adapts its variety to the speciﬁcations of both countries. The
parameter Φ ≡ φσ−1 < 1 denotes the opposite of the adaptation discount.
The lower is Φ, the higher is the adaptation discount and the lower is the
















is the price index for a consumer who has not learned foreign speciﬁcations.
A consumer who has learned the foreign speciﬁcations behaves as if the





















is the price index for a consumer who has learned foreign speciﬁcations.
The price index is lower for someone who has learned foreign speciﬁcations
(Pa <P k) because she takes the full beneﬁt of more varieties.
Let the variable λk denote the proportion of households in country k
w h od on o tl e a r nt h ef o r e i g ns p e c i ﬁcations. Hence there are four groups
of households: on the one hand, λkLk and λlLl households who have not
learned the foreign speciﬁcations and on the other hand, (1 − λk)Lk and
(1 − λl)Ll households who have learned the foreign speciﬁcations.
2.2 Firms’ behavior
The marginal productivity is normalized to one. A ﬁrm in k that has not

















7where f is the ﬁxed cost of production.

















where fa is the ﬁxed cost of adapting the variety to the foreign market. The
ﬁrm sells more to foreign consumers but faces larger ﬁxed costs.
The optimal prices are constant and equal to p ≡ pr (i)=pa (i)=






(nk + na + Φnl)
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By free entry, proﬁts of active ﬁrms must fall to zero.
2.3 Learning foreign speciﬁcations
We consider two settings. In the ﬁrst, we assume that households are unable
t ol e a r nt h ef o r e i g ns p e c i ﬁcations and we examine ﬁrms’ behavior. In the
second, we allow households to learn foreign speciﬁcations. They do learn
foreign speciﬁcations if learning provides a higher indirect utility. Because
all types of ﬁrms set the same price, p, the indirect utility of a consumer
from k who has not learned the foreign speciﬁcations is Wk where
pWk =( nk + Φnl + na)
1
σ−1 ,where k,l ∈ {r,s} and k 6= l.
The indirect utility of a consumer who has learned the foreign speciﬁcations
is Wa where
pWa =( nk + nl + na)
1
σ−1 (1 − Γ)
1
σ−1
The parameter Γ is a rescaling of the cost of learning foreign speciﬁcations,
which we assume to be identical for all consumers. We use here a multi-
plicative cost to simplify notation but all results hold with a linear cost.6
6I thank Pierre Picard for this suggestion.
8Obviously the assumption of homogeneous consumers implies that within
a country, either all households learn the foreign speciﬁcations or none of
them does it. All consumers in k learn the foreign speciﬁcations if and only
if




Nobody in k learns the speciﬁcations from l if no ﬁrm uses exclusively those
speciﬁcations, i.e. if nl =0 .
Thus, we must consider three conﬁgurations: (i) in both countries none
of the households learn the foreign speciﬁcations, λk =1for all k;( i i )i n
both countries all households learn the foreign speciﬁcations, λk =0for
all k; (iii) all households learn foreign speciﬁcations in one country whereas
none of them learn these speciﬁcations in the other country, λk =1and
λl =0for all k,l.7
We now consider the two settings. In the ﬁrst setting, households cannot
learn the foreign speciﬁcations whereas in the second setting they may learn
these speciﬁcations. To ease the notation, we normalize the size of the total
population and the total ﬁxed costs to one (Lr + Ls =1and f + fa =1 ).
3 Consumers do not learn
We analyze how ﬁrms choose to adapt their speciﬁcations in this ﬁrst setting.
Their behavior is guided by their proﬁts (1)-(2) in which we set λk =1for











We also consider two levels for the ﬁxed costs: small costs with f<1/(2Lr)
which implies Φ1 < Φ2 < Φ3 < Φ4; and large costs with f>1/(2Lr),w h i c h
implies Φ1 < Φ4 < Φ3 < Φ2.
The comparison of the proﬁts gives the next proposition which is illus-
trated in Figure 1.
7The expression in (3) could hold with equality, meaning that some households would
learn and the other would not learn. Such an equilibrium would not be stable because a
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Figure 1: Types of ﬁrms as a function of the adaptation discount.
Proposition 1 A fall in the adaptation discount induces fewer ﬁrms to
adapt their product to both countries; it induces more ﬁrms to use exclusively
the norms of the larger country. If the ﬁxed cost is small enough, it induces
fewer ﬁrms to use the norms of the smaller country.
Proof: see the Appendix.
All ﬁrms adapt their product to local consumers if the adaptation dis-
count is large, i.e. if Φ ∈ (0,Φ1).S o m eﬁrms adapt their product to local
consumers whereas the other ﬁrms use only the speciﬁcations of the large
country if Φ ∈ (Φ1,min{Φ2,Φ3}).F o r Φ ∈ (min{Φ2,Φ3},Φ4), ﬁrms use
only the speciﬁcations of their home country. Finally, for a small adapta-
tion discount, all ﬁrms use only the speciﬁcations of the large country.
Consider two countries of diﬀerent sizes, say Luxembourg and Germany.
If they chose to use a single norm, ﬁrms prefer the German norm to fully
reach the large German market even though they lose some sales on the
small Luxembourgish market. The alternative would be to chose the Lux-
embourgish norm to fully reach the small Luxembourgish market at the
cost of losing sales on the large German market. The larger country beneﬁts
from a home market eﬀect. Firms choose a single norm only if they do not
10lose too many sales on the foreign market, i.e. if the adaptation discount is
small enough. Firms prefer to adapt their product to both markets if the
adaptation discount is large.8 For countries of identical sizes, Φ1 = Φ2 and
Φ4 =1 . The top panel of Figure 1 applies (f<1): ﬁrms either adapt their
product to both markets or they split evenly between the speciﬁcations of
each country.
To what extent do the two countries have an interest to accept the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition? To answer this question, we perform a welfare
analysis when the principle is accepted by both countries. A ﬁrm that ex-
ports without having adapted its product to the host country speciﬁcations
suﬀers from the consumers adaptation discount. However this ﬁrm faces
lower ﬁxed costs. From a welfare point of view, two eﬀects have to be taken
into account. First consumers lose when buying a good that has not been
adapted. Second, more ﬁrms may enter the market because of the lower
ﬁxed costs if they do not adapt their product. More ﬁrms in the market is
beneﬁcial to consumers who exhibit a preference for variety.
If the two countries do not agree on mutual recognition, consumers can-
not buy non-adapted foreign products; it is as if Φ =0 . To check if it is
in the interest of a country to accept mutual recognition, it suﬃces to com-
pare the indirect utility of its consumers when Φ =0(mutual recognition is
not accepted) with the indirect utility when Φ > 0 (mutual recognition is
accepted). We ﬁnd the following proposition which is illustrated in Figure
2f o rσ =5 , Lr = .55, Ls = .45, fa = .2, f = .8.9











welfare in r 
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Figure 2: Welfare as a function of the adaptation discount
8We suppose that the ﬁxed cost is large enough (equivalently the adaptation cost is
small enough) to avoid Φ1 =( f − Lr)/(1 − Lr) < 0. If this condition is not met then
there is no equilibrium in which all ﬁrms adapt their product to both markets.
9Hence, Φ1 = .556, Φ2 = .6, Φ3 = .643 and Φ4 = .818.
11Proposition 2 The mutual recognition principle never harms the large coun-
try. It is neutral for the small country if the adaptation discount is large;
it is detrimental if the adaptation discount takes intermediate values; and
it is beneﬁcial if the adaptation discount is small. The mutual recognition
principle exacerbates welfare disparities across countries.
Proof: see the Appendix.
For large adaptation discounts, the adoption of the principle of mutual
recognition does not have any eﬀect because ﬁrms that adapted their product
continue to do it even though the principle is applicable.
For intermediate adaptation discounts some ﬁrms in the large country
use the principle and cease to adapt their exports, which harms consumers in
the small country particularly when the adaptation discount is not negligible.
However, more ﬁrms enter, which is beneﬁcial for both countries. The larger
country unambiguously gains whereas the net eﬀect on the smaller country
is negative for intermediate adaptation discount. The principle of mutual
recognition creates disparities across countries of diﬀerent sizes.
For a small adaptation discount the smaller country loses less when it
imports non adapted products. Hence, for a suﬃciently low value of the
adaptation discount, both countries gain because of the increased mass of
varieties. Nevertheless, the gain is larger in the large country. Again the
principle of mutual recognition creates disparities across countries of dif-
ferent sizes even though both countries gain. It is only in the absence of
adaptation discount that both countries have the same beneﬁt from adopt-
ing the principle of mutual recognition.
4 Consumers may learn
In this setting we assume that households are able to learn foreign speci-
ﬁcations. Learning is costly but it allows households to fully beneﬁtf r o m
foreign varieties that are not adapted for both countries.
We consider three conﬁgurations. First, none of the households learn the
foreign speciﬁcations. In the previous section we have analyzed the behavior
of ﬁrms under this conﬁguration. It remains to check for which values of Φ,
households indeed have no incentive to learn foreign speciﬁcations. Second,
households from one country learn foreign speciﬁcations whereas households
from the other country do not learn them. Third, all households from both
countries learn foreign speciﬁcations.
124.1 No household learn foreign speciﬁcations
I nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a th o u s e h o l d sd on o tk n o w
foreign speciﬁcations. Refusing to learn the foreign speciﬁcations is an equi-
librium for households in k if and only if the cost of learning is large enough,
i.e., if
Γ > (1 − Φ)
nl
N
for households in k (4)
It is clear that for nr ≥ ns, households from the small country s have a larger
incentive to learn foreign speciﬁcations than households from the large coun-
try r because learning opens full access to a larger set of varieties. Condition
(4) is therefore more stringent for households in s than for households in r.
We establish the following proposition where Φa and Φb are deﬁn e di nt h e
proof of the proposition.
Proposition 3 There exists Φa and Φb such that households do not learn
foreign speciﬁcations for Φ ∈ (0,Φa) and for Φ ∈ (Φb,1). Such equilibrium
does not exists for Φ ∈ (Φa,Φb).
Proof: see the Appendix.
On the one hand, if the adaptation discount is large, households do not
learn foreign speciﬁcations because most ﬁrms adapt their product. House-
holds buy few quantities of non-adapted products because of the large adap-
tation discount. Hence, ﬁrms adapt their product to sell more. On the
other hand, if the adaptation discount is low, households are not induced to
learn the foreign speciﬁcations because their adaptation discount is small.
T h es a m eh o l d sf o rﬁrms that do not adapt their product because the gain
obtained by larger sales is small. Hence, households do not learn foreign
speciﬁcations and most ﬁrms do not adapt their product.
To illustrate, let us take the same parameter values as in Figure 2 and
Γ =0 .2.T h e n Φa =0 .604 and Φb =0 .778; For an adaptation discount
Φ ∈ (0.604,0.778) an equilibrium in which households from both countries
do not learn foreign speciﬁcations does not exist. It exists outside this
domain.
4.2 Households from one country learn the foreign speciﬁ-
cations
Let all households from country l learn the foreign speciﬁcations whereas
those living in country k do not. Hence the speciﬁcations of country k are
known by all households and it is not necessary for ﬁrms to adapt their
13product to the speciﬁcations of country l. By contrast, it is proﬁtable for
ﬁrms to use speciﬁcations of country k in order to fully reach households
from that country. Hence, na = nl =0and nk > 0.T o s o l v e t h e m o d e l
analytically, it suﬃces to plug λk =1 , λl =0in (1)-(2). It is then conﬁrmed
that πk >π a and πk >π l.M o r e o v e rπk =0requires nk =1 /(σf).
Consider now the households behavior. Households from k do not learn
speciﬁcations from l b e c a u s en o n eo ft h eﬁrms use these speciﬁcations. To
what extent do households from l learn speciﬁcations from k?T h e y l e a r n
these speciﬁcations if and only if the learning costs is small enough, i.e., from
(3), if and only if Γ < 1 − Φ. Equivalently, they learn foreign speciﬁcations
if and only if the adaptation cost is large enough, i.e., Φ < 1−Γ.T h i sg i v e s
the next proposition.
Proposition 4 For Φ < 1 − Γ, there exists an equilibrium in which (1)
households from a ﬁrst country do not learn foreign speciﬁcations, (2) house-
holds from the second country learn the foreign speciﬁcations, (3) all ﬁrms
adopt the speciﬁcations of the ﬁrst country.
The proposition does not predict which speciﬁcations are adopted by
ﬁrms. It may be the speciﬁcations of the large or of the small country.
Moreover, the proposition also applies to two countries of identical sizes:a l l
ﬁrms use the speciﬁcations of a single country if the costs of learning foreign
speciﬁcations are small and if the adaptation discount is large (Φ < 1 − Γ).
Mutual recognition creates disparities. On the one hand, ﬁrms do not adapt
their product to the foreign market because foreign households have learned
t h eh o m es p e c i ﬁcations. On the other hand foreign households learn these
speciﬁcations because these are the sole speciﬁcations that are used and
because the gain of learning is high whereas the cost is low.
Let us now turn to the welfare analysis of this situation. Because ﬁrms
do not adapt their product, more ﬁrms enter the market. In country k,
households beneﬁt from a large number of varieties that ﬁt with their spec-
iﬁcations. The households in country l also fully beneﬁtf r o mt h i sl a r g e
number of varieties because they have learned the foreign speciﬁcations.
However they suﬀer from the costs of learning foreign speciﬁcations. We
ﬁnd the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that all ﬁrms chose the speciﬁcations of country k
and all households from l learn the speciﬁcations of k. Households from k
unambiguously gain from the application of the principle of mutual recog-
nition. Households from the other country gain only if the cost of learning
foreign speciﬁc a t i o n si ss m a l l( Γ < 1 − f).
14Proof: see the Appendix.
From a global point of view it is preferable that country l be the small
country, i.e. that the smallest number of households pay the costs of learning
the foreign speciﬁcations.
4.3 Households from both countries learn foreign speciﬁca-
tions
The ﬁrms do not need to adapt their product if households from both coun-
tries learn foreign speciﬁcations. Moreover the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between
both speciﬁcations. Consider a small perturbation of that equilibrium: a
small mass of households from country k have not learned foreign speciﬁ-
cations. Then ﬁrms strictly prefer the speciﬁcations of country k in order
to fully reach these deviating households. Hence, the other households in
k do not need to learn foreign speciﬁcations because ﬁrms do not use the
l speciﬁcations. The initial perturbation in which some households in k do
not learn is self-reinforcing and the equilibrium is not stable. For this reason
we do not analyze this conﬁguration further.
4.4 Multiplicity of equilibria
There exists a “no-learning” equilibrium in which households do not learn in
two cases: if Φ < Φa and if Φ > Φb. There is also a “learning equilibrium” in
which households from only one country learn foreign speciﬁcations if Φ <
1−Γ. From the proof of Proposition 3, we know that Φb ≤ 1−Γ. Hence there
is an equilibrium for all values of the adaptation discount. Moreover, there is
a multiplicity of equilibria for low values of the adaptation discount (Φ < Φa)
and, possibly, for intermediate values of the discount (Φ ∈ (Φb,1 − Γ)).
We now compare these equilibria from a welfare point of view.
Proposition 6 Suppose that in the ”learning equilibrium”, households in
country l learn the foreign speciﬁcations. Households in country k always
prefer the ”learning equilibrium”. Households in country l prefer the ”no-
learning” equilibrium if the learning cost is large, or if the adaptation dis-
count is small and l is the large country.
In the learning equilibrium, ﬁrms never adapt their product, which re-
duces the ﬁxed costs compared to the no-learning equilibrium. Hence, more
ﬁrms enter and all households beneﬁt from more varieties. Households in k
do not pay the learning costs and beneﬁt from more varieties; they thus pre-
fer the learning equilibrium. Households in l pay the learning costs. They
15prefer the learning equilibrium only if the learning cost is small enough.
M o r e o v e r ,i fc o u n t r yl is the large country and if the adaptation discount is
small, households in l = r unambiguously prefer the no-learning equilibrium
which ensures them that all ﬁrms use the norms of their own country.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The principle of mutual recognition ensures that products lawfully manu-
factured in one State are acceptable without adaptation in another State
provided that both States pursue the same general objectives in health,
safety, environment and consumer protection. By using the principle of
mutual recognition ﬁrms save the costs of adapting their product to local
norms. As a result more ﬁrms are able to enter into the market. However
the principle of mutual recognition shifts the transaction costs of adapting
to several norms from ﬁrms to consumers. Consumers suﬀer either from
consuming a good that is not perfectly adapted, or from learning foreign
norms.
In a ﬁrst setting we consider consumers who do not learn foreign norms.
Everything else equal, ﬁrms prefer the norms of the larger market, because
these norms are known by the majority of consumers. However, if the adap-
tation discount is large, some ﬁrms will also use the norms of the smaller
market. There is a home market eﬀect: the norms of the larger country
are overly used by ﬁrms. The principle of mutual recognition is unambigu-
ously welfare improving in the larger market but is welfare improving in the
smaller market only if consumers do not suﬀer too much from consuming
a non adapted product. The principle of mutual recognition is a source of
divergence.
In a second setting, we assume that consumers can learn the foreign
norms, which removes the costs of consuming a product that is not adapted
to the local norms. We show that for intermediate and for large adaptation
discounts, there exists an equilibrium in which households from one coun-
try learn the foreign norms whereas all ﬁrms use these norms that become
universally known. Households who learn the foreign norms are worse oﬀ
than households from the other country. The principle of mutual recogni-
tion fosters the use of a single norm. We also show that for small and for
large adaptation discounts, there exists an equilibrium in which households
do not learn the foreign speciﬁcations. Firms adapt their product only if
the loss is large and there is a multiplicity of equilibria. We compare the
welfare properties of these equilibria.
166 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst show that the three types of ﬁrms cannot be active simultaneously.
Second we establish the condition under which all types of ﬁrms adapt their
speciﬁcations to both countries. Third, we derive the conditions for the
coexistence of ﬁrms that have adapted their product to both speciﬁcations
with ﬁrms that use the speciﬁcation of only one country; moreover we show
that this must be ﬁrms using the large country speciﬁcations. Fourth, we
compute the conditions for the coexistence of ﬁrms that use the speciﬁcations
of the large country with ﬁrms that use the other speciﬁcations. Finally we
show that for a small adaptation discount all ﬁrms use the speciﬁcations of
the large country.
We set λk =1for all k ∈ {r,s} in the proﬁts (1) and (2). By free entry,
all ﬁrms must earn zero proﬁt. A type of ﬁrms that is expected to entail
losses is not chosen by ﬁrms.
1. There does not exist an equilibrium with three types of ﬁrms (nr > 0,
ns > 0, na > 0). Indeed setting the proﬁts equal to zero for the three
types of ﬁrms creates a system of three equations with the following two
‘unknowns’, Lr/(nr + Φns + na) and Ls/(Φnr + ns + na), which does not
have any solution.
2. An equilibrium where all ﬁrms adapt their product (nr = ns =0 ,
na > 0)r e q u i r e sπa =0and πr,πs < 0. Using (1)-(2), it is readily checked
that πa =0 ⇐⇒ na =1 /σ. The condition πs < 0 is less stringent than the
condition πr < 0,w h i c hr e q u i r e sΦ < Φ1.
3. An equilibrium where some ﬁrms adapt to the speciﬁcations of both
countries and the other ﬁrms stick to the rules of the small country (nr =0 ,
ns > 0, na > 0) is not feasible because it is easily checked that πs ≤ πr if
nr =0 , which is incompatible with ns > 0.
An equilibrium where some ﬁrms adapt to the speciﬁcations of both
countries and the other ﬁrms stick to the rules of the large country (nr > 0,
ns =0 , na > 0)r e q u i r e sπr = πa =0 , πs < 0. Using (1)-(2), it is readily
checked that πr = πa =0require
nr =
Lr (1 − Φ) − (f − Φ)
σ (1 − f)(f − Φ)
and na =
−fLr (1 − Φ)+( f − Φ)
σ (1 − f)(f − Φ)
w h i c ha r ep o s i t i v ei fa n do n l yi fΦ1 < Φ < Φ3.F i n a l l y πs < 0 ⇐⇒
Φ < Φ2. Hence, this equilibrium requires Φ1 < Φ < min{Φ2,Φ3} where
min{Φ2,Φ3} = Φ2 ⇐⇒ f<1/(2Lr).
174. An equilibrium where no ﬁrm adapts and where each country hosts
ﬁrms that have adopted the local rules (nr > 0, ns > 0, na =0 )r e q u i r e s
πr = πs =0and πa < 0. Using (1)-(2), it is readily checked that πr = πs =0
require
nr =
Lr − Φ(1 − Lr)
fσ(1 − Φ)
>n s =
1 − Lr − LrΦ
fσ(1 − Φ)
w h i c ha r ep o s i t i v ei fa n do n l yi fΦ < Φ4. Finally, πa < 0 ⇐⇒ Φ > Φ2.T h u s
this equilibrium requires Φ2 < Φ < Φ4 where Φ4 > Φ2 ⇐⇒ f<1/(2Lr).
5. An equilibrium where all ﬁrms use the local rules of the large country
(nr > 0, ns =0 , na =0 )r e q u i r e sπr =0 , πs < 0, πa < 0. Using (1)-
(2), it is readily checked that πr =0 ⇐⇒ nr =1 /(σf).M o r e o v e r ,
πs < 0 ⇐⇒ Φ > Φ4 and πa < 0 ⇐⇒ Φ > Φ3.
Note that the complementary equilibrium in which all ﬁrms would adopt
the local rules of the small country would require Φ >L r/(1 − Lr) which is
not possible under the assumption that r is the large country.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To ease notation, we rescale the indirect utility W as V ≡ σσ (W/(σ − 1))
σ−1.
If the two countries do not agree on mutual recognition, ﬁrms adapt their
product for the export market (na =1 /σ) and both countries reach the same
level of indirect utility, Vini where
Vini ≡ 1 (5)
Figure 1 identiﬁes four possible equilibria under the principle of mutual
recognition. We consider them successively.
First, for Φ ≤ Φ1,a l lﬁrms adapt their product (na =1 /σ). It is as if
the principle of mutual recognition was not used: Vr = Vs = Vini:
Second, for Φ ∈ (Φ1,min{Φ2,Φ3}),s o m eﬁrms adapt their product and








It is readily checked that households in r gain: Vr ≥ Vini for Φ ≥ Φ1,w i t h
equality at Φ = Φ1. This gain increases with Φ because more goods are then
produced. By contrast, the opposite holds for households in s, Vs ≤ Vini.
Despite the larger number of goods available when the adaptation discount
decreases, the consumers losses in s increase with Φ because fewer goods are
adapted to their country.
18Third, for Φ ∈ (Φ2,Φ4)10 ﬁrms are active in each country and they do








Again, households from r unambiguously gain (Vr >V ini) and the gain in-
creases with the value of Φ.F o r l o w v a l u e s o f Φ,h o u s e h o l d sf r o ms lose
compared to the initial situation (Vs <V ini). Nevertheless, their loss de-
creases with Φ and may vanish for a suﬃciently large value of Φ.
Finally, for Φ ∈ (min{Φ3,Φ4},1) ﬁrms stick to the rules of the larger
country. Because the adaptation discount is small, the small country does









Households in r gain compared to the initial situation but their gain is now
independent of Φ.H o u s e h o l d s i n s may lose for low values of Φ but they
gain for values of Φ that are larger than f.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
First consider Φ ∈ (0,Φ1). According to Figure 1, all ﬁrms adapt their
product, nr = ns =0 , na > 0. Clearly all goods are available at local speci-
ﬁcations meaning that households from both countries do not need to learn
the foreign speciﬁcations. This is conﬁrmed by (4) which is always fulﬁlled
at nr = ns =0 . Hence, there exists an equilibrium in which households
do not learn the foreign speciﬁcations and all ﬁrms adapt their product if
Φ ∈ (0,Φ1).
Second consider Φ ∈ (Φ1,min{Φ2,Φ3}). Firms that adapt their prod-
uct coexist with ﬁr m st h a tu s eo n l yt h es p e c i ﬁcations of the large country,
ns =0 , na,n r > 0. We plug the value of nr and na found in the proof of
Proposition 1 in (4) to show that the households from s do not learn the
r-speciﬁcations if and only if
Φ < Φa ≡ Φ1 + Γ(1 − f)
Lr
1 − Lr
Hence, there exists an equilibrium in which households do not learn the for-
eign speciﬁcations and ﬁrms either adapt their product or use exclusively the
10If f>1/(2Lr).
19norm of the large country (na,n r > 0, ns =0 )i fΦ ∈ (Φ1,min{Φa,Φ2,Φ3}).
Third, consider Φ ∈ (Φ2,Φ4) (and thus, Φ3 < Φ4;t h i si st h et o pp a n e lo f
Figure 1). Some ﬁrms use exclusively the norm of the large country and the
other ﬁrms use the norm of the small country, nr,n s > 0, na =0 .W ep l u g
the value of nr and ns found in the proof of Proposition 1 in (4) to show





Hence, there exists an equilibrium in which households do not learn the
foreign speciﬁcations and ﬁrms either use exclusively the norm of the large
country or the norm of the small country (nr,n s > 0, na =0 )i fΦ ∈
(max{Φ2,Φ0
b},Φ4). This interval could be empty.
Fourth, consider Φ ∈ (max(Φ3,Φ4),1).A l l ﬁrms use exclusively the
norm of the large country r, nr > 0, ns = na =0 . From (4), households
from s do not learn foreign speciﬁcations if and only if Γ > 1−Φ, i.e., if and
only if
Φ > Φ00
b ≡ 1 − Γ
Hence, there exists an equilibrium in which households do not learn the
foreign speciﬁcations and ﬁrms use exclusively the norm of the large country
(nr > 0, ns = na =0 )i fΦ ∈ (max{Φ3,Φ4,Φ00
b},1). This interval is never
empty.
It is readily checked that
Φ0




Hence, we can summarize the third and fourth points with the following
statement. Let Φb be the minimum of Φ0
b and Φ00
b if Φ4 > Φ3 (top panel
of Figure 1) and Φb be Φ00
b if Φ4 < Φ3 (bottom panel of Figure 1). Then
there exists an equilibrium in which households do not learn the foreign
speciﬁcations if Φ ∈ (Φb,1).
To sum up, an equilibrium in which households do not learn foreign
speciﬁcations exists for Φ < Φa and Φ > Φb.I td o e sn o te x i s ti fΦa < Φ <
Φb.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
If the two countries do not agree on mutual recognition, ﬁrms adapt their
p r o d u c tf o rt h ee x p o r tm a r k e t( na =1 /σ) and both countries reach the
20s a m el e v e lo fw e l f a r e ,Vini given in (5). If all ﬁrms choose the speciﬁcations
of country k and households from l learn these speciﬁcations, nk =1 /(σf) >







where k ∈ {r,s} and k 6= l (9)
Country k unambiguously gains by adopting the principle of mutual recog-
nition. Households in country l g a i ni ft h ec o s t so fl e a r n i n gi sl o w( Γ < 1−f)
but they lose otherwise.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 6
In the learning equilibrium, nl = na =0 , nk =1 /(σf) and the indirect
utility of households in k is Vk =( 1 /f) whereas it is Va =( 1− Γ)/f for
households in l.
Consider now the equilibrium in which households do not learn. Let us
start with Φ < Φ1.T h u s ,nr = ns =0and na =1 /σ and the indirect utility
of households is Vr = Vs = Vini =1 .H o u s e h o l d si nk unambiguously prefer
that households learn in l whereas the households in l prefer the equilibrium
with learning only if the learning cost is small enough (i.e., only if Γ < 1−f).
Second, consider Φ ∈ (Φ1,min{Φ2,Φ3}). The indirect utility of house-
holds is given in (6). Households in k unambiguously prefer that households
learn in l because 1/f is larger than the two expressions in (6) for any
Φ < Φ3.H o u s e h o l d s i n l also prefer the equilibrium with learning only if
the learning cost is small enough.
Third, consider Φ ∈ (min{Φ2,Φ3},Φ4). The indirect utility of house-
holds is given in (7). Households in k unambiguously prefer that households
learn in l because 1/f is larger than the two expressions in (7) for any
Φ < Φ4.H o u s e h o l d s i n l also prefer the equilibrium with learning only if
the learning cost is small enough.
Fourth, consider Φ > max{Φ3,Φ4}. The indirect utility of households
is given in (8). Households in k prefer that households learn in l (with
indiﬀerence if k is the large country). Households in l prefer the no learning
equilibrium if l is the large country. Otherwise, they prefer the learning
equilibrium only if the cost of learning is small enough.
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